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“it is the transferability of rights that is the basis of the mass marketing of the human 
image and the human voice in the communications industries” (Gaines 1991, p. 155) 
Abstract 
In 1944, two California courts agreed with actor Olivia De Havilland’s claim that the state’s seven 
year limit on the enforceability of employment contracts applied to her 1936 contract with Warner 
Bros. Pictures, and refused to enforce the contract beyond its seventh anniversary. This article 
revisits the well-known De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures (1944) Appellate Court decision, and 
its lesser-known, lower court antecedent, in order to explore the decisions’ related but distinct 
assumptions about employment, employers, and employees. Both courts agreed (1) that 
employees need protection from excesses of employee power, (2) that employment is a public, 
social phenomenon, and (3) that protection may (and must) be afforded by the police powers of 
the state; this article analyses illuminating differences in the courts’ rationales. Examining the 
politics of star employment is worthwhile for more than just historical reasons: star employment 
constitutes a “limit case” of employment, illuminating in its extremes features that are central to 
but generally obscure in the run of daily working life. The limit case, in this instance, re-injects 
controversy into what appears to be a settled institution of modern life. Revisiting episodes of 
struggle over the terms of star employment makes available a set of critical concepts useful in 
contesting (neo)liberal common sense about employment as a strictly private affair. De Havilland’s 
two cases and decisions—fascinating and compelling in what they contribute to our knowledge of 
Hollywood’s labour history—bequeath intellectual tools useful in the dissection of the politics of 
employment today. 
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1. Introduction    
In the 1964 film Lady in a Cage, a 48-year-old Olivia De Havilland plays Cornelia Hilyard, a 
wealthy, recently disabled widow held captive by a group of violent outlaws. Trapped by an 
electricity outage in an elevator suspended between the ground floor and mezzanine of her 
mansion’s main hall, Mrs Hilyard is tormented psychologically and then physically as the trio 
ransacks her home. Freedom only comes when she pierces the eyes of her would-be 
murderer with a pair of pencils, causing him to stumble blindly, in agony, into Hollywood 
traffic. Twenty years before, De Havilland had freed herself from captivity of a different kind: 
a potentially interminable ‘option’ contract with Warner Bros. Pictures that she had signed as 
a relatively powerless 19-year-old unknown in 1936. In 1943, the actor learned of Warner 
Bros’ intention to keep her working well past the nominal seven year duration of her contract, 
and of a state labour law that limited the enforceability of employment contracts to seven 
years. At that point, she turned to the Los Angeles Superior Court for a declaration on her 
right to end her relationship with the studio on that anniversary. Fortunately, the 26-year-old 
De Havilland did not have to stab anyone escape that particular cage. Judge Charles Burnell 
affirmed her right under California’s “seven year rule”, observing that without recourse to the 
rule, the state’s workers could be susceptible to conditions of “life bondage” (De Haviland v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures, 1944a)1. In December of 1944 the Court of Appeal for the Second 
District of California affirmed the lower court’s refusal to enforce the contract, laying down a 
judicial interpretation bearing on the social mobility of California workers that has resonated 
in entertainment industries ever since, even while it declines to echo Burnell’s strong 
language (De Haviland v. Warner Bros Pictures, 1944b). 
1 
The Appellate Court’s strict interpretation of the state’s seven year rule in De Haviland has 
been discussed in the American entertainment law literature (e.g. Grogan, 1978-79; 
Steinberg, 1981; Blaufarb, 1983-84; Greenberg, 1994) and cited in related cases brought 
mainly by musicians and athletes (e.g. MCA Records v. Newton-John [1979]; Oscar De la 
Hoya v. Top Rank [2001]). Notably, in 1979, the same Appellate Court concurred in its 
reading of the law in recording artist Olivia Newton-John’s contract duration dispute with MCA 
Records. In 1987, in the wake of this similarly absolute decision, the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) obtained an amendment to the state’s Labor Code which 
excluded recording artists from the seven year rule’s protection (Greenberg, 1994, Stahl, 
2013). In 2001 and 2002, seeking to repeal that 1987 exclusion, recording artists, their 
advocates, and legislators invoked De Haviland in their arguments to reintroduce the limit to 
contract duration for that group (Stahl, 2013). 
2 
A core premise of the published 1944 De Haviland decision is that there is a basic public 
interest in the regulation of work and the protection of employees from excesses of employer 
power. Today, as neoliberal common-sense works to renaturalize a conception of work as a 
fundamentally private relation, whose terms are of concern only to the formally equal 
contracting parties, compelling arguments for a public interest in work deserve exploration. 
By revisiting this resonant decision and its lesser-known predecessor, this article seeks to do 
just that. Admittedly, a focus on a case that turned on the seven year rule may seem narrow; 
the right to be released from a contract after seven years is of use only to a small subset of 
American employees. These days, it is likely that many workers would be only too happy to 
be able to look forward to seven years or more of steady employment. However, the political 
import of contract duration—the fact that, in liberal thought, ‘the limitation on the duration of 
the contract appears to be the only thing that divides a slave from a servant or wage laborer’ 
(Pateman, 1988, p. 71)—gives struggles over this right a heightened interpretive usefulness. 
The argument here is that this narrowly-defined contest actually goes to the heart of 
normalized but still troublesome aspects of employment, opening up much broader themes 
for discussion and debate. And indeed, bringing the preceding, unpublished, and more 
trenchant decision of Los Angeles Superior Court judge Charles Burnell into dialogue with the 
subsequent Appellate ruling widens the issue. Where the Appellate decision offers an 
appealing narrative of mid-20th century American economic expansion and social mobility to 
support its affirmation of employees’ inalienable rights, Judge Burnell offers an incisive 
argument that is much more starkly attuned to the politics of social class and political status 
contained in the modern employment relation. Considered in combination, these two 
decisions offer tools for the conceptual dissection of employment in modern society and for 
the contradiction of widespread commonplaces about the private or non-political nature of 
work. 
3 
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The idea here is that contests between stars like De Havilland and Newton-John and their 
employers present star employment as a limit case of work in liberal society. Its reversals and 
involutions of routine employment norms do not place it beyond the limits of liberal 
employment, nor do they rewrite the fundamental roles of employer and employee. Rather, 
they put pressure these roles that lays their political character bare. For example, when 
people compete for jobs (which is normal in periods of relatively high unemployment such our 
own), employers are empowered to dictate terms. Since the 1970s, in the context of an on-
going diminution of union membership among US workers (Lichtenstein, 2002) and the 
accelerating neoliberal rollback of state social investment and protection (Harvey, 2005), and 
especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, this imbalance has only intensified 
(Standing, 2010). By contrast, employers are likely to find themselves in competition, and 
much less able to dictate terms, where ‘imperfectly substitutable’ (Menger, 2002, p. 86) star 
workers like De Havilland and Newton-John are concerned. This turnabout is in part what 
conjures star labour as a limit case. When (star) employees hold a lion’s share of bargaining 
power, employers cannot depend on the dull compulsion of the market to motivate them 
toward obedience. In this situation, employers sometimes engage extreme tactics such as 
highly restrictive, potentially interminable contracts, negative injunctions (Carton, 1998), or 
efforts to change or introduce legislation (Stahl, 2011). These efforts, and especially 
arguments over them, bring out into the open tensions between voluntarism and coercion 
that inhabit ‘freedom of contract’ and the core of the employment relation in liberal market 
society. 
4 
The long-term option contract pressed on new entrants was one such measure in the heyday 
of Hollywood studio system. Forced upon most new talent, bolstered by the threat of 
burdensome lawsuits, this contract form keeps employees’ bargaining power to a minimum 
by precluding their access to an open market for their services far into the future, presenting 
an organisational solution to the problem of excessive demand and competition for star labour 
by studios (Klaprat, 1985; Carman, 2008), as well as a strategy of maximizing the value of 
studio control of star labour (through, for example, the profitable “loaning out” of stars to 
other studios (Balio, 1993, p. 157; King, 1986; Greenfield and Osborn, 1998, pp. 12-17)). 
Such contracts achieved their greatest usefulness when an actor became popular: the studio 
could take advantage of a rising star’s increased drawing power at the cost, often, only of 
incremental increases in salary and other contractual terms.2 Their primary justifications are 
classical liberal platitudes that are regaining legitimacy as neoliberalism becomes hegemonic: 
the employment relation is private, voluntary, and consensual. The two courts rejected these 
positions, explaining that employment is a valid target of public policy that requires strict 
regulation—beyond baselines of health and safety requirements—in order to prevent 
employers from impeding employees’ socio-economic mobility, their autonomy and self-
determination in the economic sphere. The decision of the lower court, in fact, explicitly 
framed employment as a relation categorically susceptible to abuse by employers. 
5 
2. The Politics of Hollywood Studio System Talent 
Contracts  
  
During Hollywood’s (approximately) 1928 to 1948 “studio system” era, a handful of vertically-
integrated motion picture companies (MGM, Paramount, Fox, Warner Bros., and RKO) 
controlled most US film production and distribution. These companies produced films through 
their own extensive studio facilities and full-time creative and technical staffs (including 
directors, talent, and craftspeople) and controlled their circulation through their ownership 
and/or control of systems of distribution and of exhibition (see Schatz, 1988; Gomery, 
2005).3 Star contracts were central to the studio system business model; according to Kathy 
Klaprat (Klaprat, 1985, p. 351), ‘[s]tars established the value of motion pictures as a 
marketable commodity…by virtue of their unique appeal and [audience] drawing power.’ 
Olivia De Havilland’s 1936 contract with Warner Bros. Studios exemplifies the standard 
contract of the era, built on a series of ‘options’: the company gave itself the option, at a 
number of predetermined points, to either cancel or renew the contract. Not all studio system 
actors’ contracts were as constraining as De Havilland’s; some stars—particularly those with 
dogged agents or a great deal of bargaining power and will—enjoyed considerable autonomy 
in their relations with the studios (Kemper, 2010; Carman, 2008). In fact, in the years 
preceding De Havilland’s contest with Warner Bros. Studios, female performers emancipated 
themselves from studio contracts with greater frequency than males. In Hollywood in the 
1930s, Emily Carman writes, “the number of female freelance stars substantially 
6 
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outnumbered their male counterparts’ (Carman, 2012, p. 13). Nevertheless, long-term, highly 
restrictive option contracts were the studio system norm for male and female stars. 
An immediate effect of this contracting regime was the long-term subordination of valuable 
actors. Bette Davis highlighted the power of Warner Bros. to impose suspensions of her 
contract. Under their employment bargain, she averred, 
I could be forced to do anything the studio told me to do. … The only recourse was to refuse, and then you were suspended 
without pay. These original [contracts] were so one-sided in favor of the studio that … when under suspension you could not 
even work in a five-and-dime store. You could only starve, which of necessity often made you give in to the demands of the 
studio (quoted in Balio, 1993, p. 143). 
7 
Statements such as this one exaggerate; ‘starving’ was not a likely outcome. But Davis’ 
forceful language also mirrors the political-legal force available to companies holding such 
contracts (Greenfield and Osborn, 1998). The well-known contracts of Davis and De Havilland 
are among the many that evince this politics of long-term capture and control; their 
characteristic suspension clauses will play a central role in this analysis.4  
8 
Film scholars have long had an interest in star contracts. The focus, for example, in the work 
of Schatz (1988), Balio (1993), and Gomery (2005) has largely been on particular contracts, 
on ‘contracts as social artifacts’ to use Mark Suchman’s felicitous phrase. Film historians have 
developed accounts, in Suchman’s words, of ‘(1) the microdynamics of why and how 
transacting parties craft individual contract devices, and (2) the macrodynamics of why and 
how larger social systems generate and sustain distinctive contract regimes’ (Suchman, 2003, 
p. 91). Film studies’ principal approach has been to examine individual contracts and the 
studio system regime in which they figure. This literature has brought to light the degree to 
which the system depended on the long-term capture and control of the acting services of 
prominent stars, the ways studios maximized the stability and profitability of that control, 
and, more recently, the curiously intimate relations of power the contracts codified. Aspiring 
stars entered willingly and gladly into even the most restrictive contracts; for many of them, 
the studio contract had social-symbolic resonance far beyond its actual clauses and their 
political import—it signified entry into what Greenfield and Osborn call the ‘holy of holies’: a 
‘dream world’ which promises ‘escape’ from the workaday world (Greenfield & Osborn, 1998, 
p. 177). The work of Kemper (2010) and Carman (2008) suggests that most actors did not 
contest their contracts, at least not in ways that left clear traces. But in some important 
cases, the politics of the contract posed problems that would not be ignored. Given the type 
of value motion picture companies perceived in stars, and the long-term political-economic 
role stars played in the Hollywood studio system, the strikingly indefinite nature of the option 
contract as implemented by the studios gave several California judges pause in 1944. 
9 
De Havilland’s Contract and Petition for Declaratory Judgment    
In 1936, Olivia De Havilland and Warner Bros. Pictures entered into a standard option 
contract. The contract specified an initial year of employment followed by six successive one-
year options, each of which the studio exercised. The contract contained a version of the 
typical suspension clause mentioned above by Bette Davis: 
In addition to all other rights and remedies the Producer may have, the Producer, at its option, in the event of the failure, 
refusal or neglect of the Artist to perform her services to the full extent of her ability, and as instructed by the Producer, shall 
have the right to refuse to pay the artist any compensation during the period of such failure, refusal or neglect on the part of 
the Artist, and shall, likewise, have the right to extend the term of this agreement and all of its provisions for a period 
equivalent to the period during which such failure, refusal or neglect shall have continued (De Havilland / Warner Bros. 
1936 ¶ 25, emphasis added). 
10 
As Bette Davis and film scholars suggest, such clauses could play significant roles in actors’ 
careers; it is the statement about the right to extend the agreement that was the fulcrum of 
De Havilland’s dispute with Warner Bros. During the seven years of De Havilland’s initial and 
option periods, Warner Bros. suspended the contract for a total of 25 weeks. One month-long 
suspension was due to the actor’s illness; the remainder to De Havilland’s refusal to play 
certain roles offered to her. De Havilland explained her motivation to refuse some roles to an 
interviewer many years later: 
I knew that I had an audience, that people really were interested in my work, and they would go to see a film because I was in 
11 
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it, and I had a responsibility toward them, among other things. I couldn't bear to disappoint them by doing indifferent work at 
an indifferent film (quoted in Academy of Achievement, 2010, n.p.n.) 
De Havilland’s retrospective framing of her ‘responsibility’ to her audience may reflect some 
self-mythologization. Nevertheless, whether or not her motives were lofty in artistic terms, by 
refusing a role De Havilland triggered the suspension clause. Warner Bros., in De Havilland’s 
words, ‘would then suspend the contract for the length of time it took another actress to play 
the role, and they would take that period of time [and] tack it on to the end of the contract. 
So in May of 1943 [at the seventh anniversary of the contract], I found myself with six 
months of suspension time’ (quoted in Academy of Achievement, 2010, n.p.n.). Warner Bros. 
asserted that they had a right under the contract to exclusive control of her services for those 
six months, beyond the expiration of the initial and option periods. 
12 
Around that time, De Havilland’s agents introduced the actor to lawyer Martin Gang who, they 
told her, thought there was ‘a way out’ for her (quoted in Academy of Achievement, 2010, 
n.p.n.). Gang explained California’s seven year rule to De Havilland and outlined possible 
obstacles to her desired outcome of free agency. This is the relevant passage of the statute: 
‘A contract to render personal service may not be enforced against the employee beyond 
seven years from the commencement of service under it’ (California Labor Code section 
2855). In August 1943, Gang petitioned the Los Angeles Superior Court on behalf of the actor 
for ‘a declaration of [De Havilland’s] rights or duties under [her] written contract’ which would 
clarify exactly which party was entitled to do what, in a legally binding way (De Havilland, 
1944, p. 2). Gang and De Havilland asserted that the actor’s seven years were up and that 
she was entitled to free agency. Warner Bros. countered that at the time of her suit, due to 
the contract’s several suspensions, De Havilland had only rendered her services for ‘six years, 
twenty-six and three-eighths weeks’ and that the studio was entitled by the contract to seven 
years of ‘actual service’ (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1944, p. 2). De Havilland and Gang were thus 
particularly interested in a declaration by the court regarding the scope and applicability of 
the seven year rule. 
13 
The Superior Court Decision    
Judge Charles Burnell declared in favour of De Havilland on March 14, 1944. In his opinion 
Burnell itemized examples of the contract’s one-sidedness, paying special attention to the 
suspension clause at the heart of the controversy. Burnell then rehearsed the several 
iterations of the seven year rule since its 1872 codification, asserting that ‘[l]aws of this 
character are enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state and for the purpose of 
protecting employees’ (Burnell, 1944, p. 7). Burnell’ s analysis raised the seven year rule’s 
political logic into high relief. He argued that the law’s encroachment on employers’ and 
employees’ freedom of contract was 
obviously intended for the purpose of protecting the employee from contracts of peonage or indefinite servitude by limiting 
the time for which he may bind himself or be bound to the service of another, and thus be deprived of the right to better his 
condition by obtaining other employment. Such laws are purely for the protection of the employee and should be construed 
most favorably to him. (id. p. 7-8) 
14 
Anticipating a major theme of the later decision by the Court of Appeal, the judge also 
asserted that such laws, to be effective, must be inalienable. Finally, Burnell pointed to the 
gravity of the threat embedded in Warner Bros. Pictures’ claim that the statute’s ‘ seven 
years’ meant seven years of ‘actual service.’ He noted that the studio’s construction of the 
seven year rule could “easily result” in a contract such as De Havilland’s ‘being indefinitely 
extended, even to the point of constituting life bondage for the employee’ (id. p. 14). Under 
the terms of a contract like De Havilland’s, Burnell observed, 
[r]oles might be assigned to an artist which she could not conscientiously portray. It would even be possible, if an artist 
should incur the ill will of a producer, to require her to portray roles which would entirely destroy her popularity and value 
as an artist, and because of her refusal to demean herself, suspensions and elections to extend the term of the contract would 
prevent her from ever seeking other employment. She might suffer long periods of illness and the life of the contract might at 
the option of the producer be extended, as has been said, indefinitely, thus precluding her from ever working for any other 
employer. It was to prevent such a condition of peonage or serfdom that the statute was enacted (ibid.).
5
  
15 
On the basis of this extrapolation and interpretation the judge concluded that the suspension 
and extension provisions in the contract are ‘wholly inoperable in so far as they attempt to 
16 
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make the contract enforceable after the expiration of seven years from the commencement of 
service thereunder’ (id. p. 15). 
Judge Burnell’s declaratory judgement and opinion focus closely on the relations of 
domination and subordination into which employers and employees routinely contractually 
place themselves: employees are paid to obey and an indefinite contract can mean an 
indefinite obligation to obey. An employer’s power to impose penalties on the failure to 
obey—through formal means such as injunction or damages, or informal means such as (for 
example) blackballing—raises the stakes considerably. Steinfeld argues that coercion in work 
and to work exists when an employer ‘is in a position to force another person to choose 
between labor and some more disagreeable alternative to the labor’ (Steinfeld, 2001, p. 19). 
The studio wagers, in this case, that the threat of legal costs and possibly dire professional 
consequences poses a very disagreeable set of alternatives to continued work. Burnell’s stark 
understanding of the disability of the employee under contract sensitizes him to the need for 
the exercise of the ‘police powers of the state’ in protecting the rights of employees against 
the political-economic power of employers, and to the potentially perverse results of freedom 
of contract between manifestly unequal parties. This perspective is made clear in the passage 
quoted above in which Burnell outlines particular ways a film studio could legally capture and 
control all the labour services an actor might be able to offer in an entire lifetime, absent an 
employee’s inalienable right to a fixed maximum contract term. Such a right, seen from this 
view, constitutes an important check on employers’ ability to exploit the relation of command 
and obedience beyond a certain maximum; in this it has much in common with other 
workplace rights, such as those pertaining to hours, health, and safety. 
17 
3. The Appellate Court’s Decision in De Haviland    
Warner Bros. objected to Judge Burnell’s interpretation of the statute and appealed the 
decision of the Superior Court. In their appeal, the studio argued that by agreeing to the 
suspension clause, De Havilland had waived her right to end her employment at seven years. 
In rejecting the film company’s appeal, however, the higher court took a different tack than 
the lower court with respect the politics of employment. While both courts found the right 
inalienable (and hence unwaivable), the higher court simultaneously broadened the rationale 
for affirming a strict reading of the seven year rule and shunned Burnell’s class analysis, 
blunting the critical edge of the rule and its earlier interpretation. The three judge panel 
avoided terms like ‘peonage’, ‘serfdom’, and ‘life bondage’ in their analysis, considering 
instead the place of labour in the social world and some of the more homely and practical 
reasons why individual working people need an inalienable right to change employers every 
so often. Shifting away from Burnell’s position, the appellate court based their rejection of 
Warner Bros. Pictures’ appeal on the three interlocking themes: 
1. That work is social and that there is public interest in regulating supposedly individual, private work 
relationships; 
2. That a time limit on contracts is to be strictly interpreted and enforced; and 
3. That the right the law creates for workers is (and must be) inalienable to be effective. 
18 
It may fairly be pointed out that these themes invoke non-controversial understandings of 
work and employee-employer power relations (and that they do so in a tone that is far more 
measured than that of Judge Burnell). But today, as neoliberal conceptions of employment as 
private and individual rather than public and social become dominant, even these more 
measured and less tendentious conceptions begin to seem remote and fatally idealistic. Amid 
successive waves of privatization, attacks on pensions, welfare, and employment insurance, 
and bouts of union-busting, the idea that any rights other than those related to property and 
to voting should be guaranteed to citizens appears increasingly incredible.6 Framed in the 
broadly pro-social terms chosen by the De Haviland court, stripped of the harsh and archaic-
sounding vocabulary used by Burnell, and substantiated through appeals to core conceptual 
features of the ‘American dream’ of social mobility, however, these themes gently but firmly 
prod us to think about the degree of voluntarism in operation in any given contractual 
situation, as well as the voluntarism involved in being without work. 
19 
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First Theme: A public interest in work    
When Marx famously referred to the workplace as ‘the hidden abode of production, on whose 
threshold there stares us in the face “No admittance except on business”’ (Marx, 1967, p. 
176), he was highlighting the classical liberal conception of employment in capitalist society 
as an essentially private affair. Warner Bros sought to extend and protect their control of De 
Havilland’s acting services—her labour—by making the argument that the contract is nobody’s 
business but theirs. In appealing the Superior Court’s rejection of the De Havilland contract’s 
suspension clause, Warner Bros. held that the seven year rule was a particular, private law, 
not a universal, public law, and that the employment contract constituted the employee as a 
private individual entitled to waive the seven year rule. Warner Bros. relied on Section 3513 
of the California Civil Code, which states that ‘[a]nyone may waive the advantage of a law 
intended solely for his benefit’. In other words, Warner Bros. asserted that their contract with 
De Havilland was with someone whose status was essentially private and individual, and that 
their claims on the suspension time were sound under the ‘private law’ understanding of 
contract. Espousing a classical approach to contract, Warner Bros. sought to tack the ‘No 
admittance’ sign on their abode of production. However, the subsequent phrase of Section 
3513 of the Civil Code holds that ‘a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened 
by a private agreement’. The appellate court’s decision on Warner Bros. Pictures’ assertion of 
privacy would hinge on the court’s understanding of the nature of labour: is labour private or 
public? Individual or social? 
20 
The appellate court, like the lower court, rejected the studio’s view of labour and refused to 
honour the studio’s ‘No admittance’ sign. The historical context of the decisions helps explain 
the court’s perspective on the nature of labour. The case was argued and resolved during 
World War II, a period when American common sense was generally in labour’s favour. The 
class politics of the depression, the pro-labour discourse and legislation of the New Deal, and 
the early 1940s war effort helped recast labour as a public, social phenomenon. At this time, 
against the classical liberal common sense captured in Marx’ famous line, principles of 
transparency, democracy, and public interest had real purchase on the ‘private sphere’ of 
employment. To a much greater degree than the lower court, the Court of Appeals made the 
social and public nature of work a centrepiece of their argument. Their decision notes that ‘ 
[d]efendant [Warner Bros.] insists that the limitations [in the seven year rule] were enacted 
solely for the benefit of employees[,] and not for a public reason, and [thus] may be waived’. 
On the contrary, the court argued, ‘[t]he fact that a law may be enacted in order to confer 
benefits upon an employee group, far from shutting out the public interest, may be strong 
evidence of it’ . ‘It is safe to say’, the court continued, 'that the great majority of men and 
women who work are engaged in rendering personal services under employment contracts. 
Without their labors the activities of the entire country would stagnate. Their welfare is the 
direct concern of every community” (De Haviland v. Warner Bros., 1944b, p. 988, italics 
added). This is a very strong argument in favour of a public, social conception of work. At its 
core, the court argues, work connects members of a community in a vital web of 
interdependence, and employee rights are ‘rights created in the public interest [that] may not 
be contravened by private agreement’. This is a perspective that has lost much legitimacy in 
the decades following the United States’ 1980s and 90s adoption of a virtual public policy of 
union busting (Dumenil and Lévy, 2004; Gamble, Ludlam, Taylor, and Wood, 2007; Gall, 
Wilkinson, and Hurd, 2011) and the recent tightening of welfare restrictions in the United 
States and around the developed world (Chappell, 2010; Wacquant, 2009; Reese, 2011). 
21 
Second Theme: Seven years and no more    
Warner Bros. appealed the Superior Court’s interpretation of the seven year rule. In their 
interpretation of the law, the seven year rule was intended to limit the enforceability of 
contracts to seven years of actual service, not seven calendar years. Thus, in their view, the 
addition of six months’ suspension time at the seventh anniversary of the contract allows 
Warner Bros. to claim the full seven years of service owed them. In response to this claim, 
the court makes plain what Blaufarb (1983-84, p. 668) calls its ‘absolute’ reading of the 
statute: 
[w]e cannot believe that the [statutory] phrase ‘for a term not beyond a period of seven years’ carries a hidden meaning. It 
cannot be questioned that the limitation of time to which [the seven year rule has] related [since] 1872 … was one to be 
measured in calendar years. […] It is difficult—in fact, too difficult—to believe that a purpose which could have been 
expressed so simply and clearly was intentionally buried under the camouflage of uncertainty and ambiguity (De Haviland v. 
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Warner Bros. Pictures, 1944b, p. 986). 
The court then offered its rationale for its endorsement of the legislation’s firm seven year 
limit. The court stated that social and economic mobility are central values and public policy 
aims in the state of California, where ‘[s]even years of time is fixed as the maximum time for 
which [employees] may contract for their services without the right to change employers or 
occupations. Thereafter, they may make a change if they deem it necessary or advisable’. 
‘There are innumerable reasons’, the decision continues, 
why a change of employment may be to their advantage. Considerations relating to age or health, to the rearing and 
schooling of children, new economic conditions and social surroundings may call for a change. As one grows more 
experienced and skillful there should be a reasonable opportunity to move upward and to employ his abilities to the best 
advantage and for the highest obtainable compensation (id. p. 988). 
23 
Where Superior Court judge Burnell warned against an employer’s ability and impetus to take 
advantage of an alienable right to control the labour of an employee indefinitely, the appellate 
court shifted the focus to themes and images redolent of the American dream of economic 
expansion and social mobility characteristic of what Paul Krugman has called the ‘great 
compression,’ a mid-20th century period in which, in contrast to the present, the distribution 
of American wealth and income was historically flat (Krugman, 2009, p. 37). Nevertheless, 
this is a somewhat paradoxical rationale for the government’s encroachment on the right of 
freedom of contract. Initially, the court had noted that the state depended on the activities 
and welfare of all working men and women; now, however, the focus shifts to individuals and 
their desires. The paradoxical legacy of the appellate court’s rhetorical shift is discussed 
further in section 4. 
24 
Third Theme: An inalienable right    
The appellate court’s assertion of a strong public interest in employment and the necessity of 
a time limit on the enforceability of employment contracts makes it plain that workers’ 
individual social mobility requires ironclad protection. The right to change employers or quit 
employment at a certain time, in order to do its job, must be inalienable; De Havilland cannot 
have waived it because it is not susceptible to waiving; it is inalienable. ‘ Finally’, the court 
stated, 
it may be pointed out that… if the power to waive [the statute] exists at all, the statute accomplishes nothing. An agreement 
to work for more than seven years would be an effective waiver of the right to quit at the end of seven. The right given by the 
statute can run in favor of those [workers] only who have contracted to work for more than seven years[,] and as these 
[workers] would have waived the right by contracting it away, the statute could not operate at all (id. p. 989, emphasis 
added). 
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Almost sarcastically, the court continued, ‘It could scarcely have been the intention of the 
Legislature to protect employees from the consequences of their improvident contracts and 
still leave them free to throw away the benefits conferred upon them’ (ibid.). In other words, 
despite your voluntary agreement to serve for a period of longer than seven years, the state 
refuses to enforce a contract beyond seven years because it holds that it’s better for society 
and for you that you be free every seven years, whether you want to be or not. Liberals 
(classical and neo) and other market boosters regard such a rule as interventionist, even 
paternalistic, an assertion of what Berlin (1969) called ‘positive liberty’. Berlin contrasts 
positive liberty—freedom to—with the ‘negative liberty’ or freedom from. In C.B. 
Macpherson’s (1977) analysis, the former corresponds to a ‘developmental’ conception of 
liberal democracy, in which freedom to develop one’s capacities as one chooses requires the 
regulation of the more powerful, the latter to a ‘protective’ conception of liberal democracy, in 
which the most important principal is protection from regulation, from constraints or coercion 
imposed by a sovereign. 
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As the ruling of the higher court, the Court of Appeal’s decision carries greater weight than 
that of the Los Angeles Superior Court. The appellate court’s rejection of the studio’s appeal 
created an important precedent in cases regarding entertainment industry contracts, notably 
including the 1979 decision in MCA v. Olivia Newton-John and the 2001 decision emancipating 
boxer Oscar De la Hoya from his contract with the promoter Top Rank. However, the 
decision’s three key points – its recognition of the social dimension of work and its absolute 
interpretations of the seven year limit and the rationale behind its inalienability – while 
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casting a long pro-labour shadow over the entertainment industries, at the same time 
obscure the more incisive insights of Judge Burnell. 
4. Appellate Court’s Silence on/and the Politics of 
Employment  
  
Not only did the appellate court eschew the evocative language of the lower court, its delicate 
avoidance of class politics is visible in a discursive shift within the decision itself. The 
appellate court’s decision in De Haviland is characterized by a signal silence, found in the 
slippage from the Court’s framing of a rationale in collective terms to its eventual framing in 
individual terms. The court declined to step back and specify, as had Burnell, the social forces 
against which the right to change employers operates. They sidestepped the problem of 
employers’ market power and the ease with which, absent the positive protection of working 
people, that market power may become coercive power. The court asserted that individual 
social mobility is in the public interest, but did not take up Burnell’s assertion that the threat 
to individual social mobility is the power of employers as a class to set the terms on which 
they will grant individuals access to the means of making a living.7  
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The De Haviland court’s refusal to outline a broader politics endows this decision with a 
paradoxical legacy. To put the matter briefly, in 1987 the Recording Industry Association of 
American obtained legislation to ‘carve out’ recording artists from the seven year rule’s 
protection (Stahl, 2013). When recording artists attempted to recover this protection in 2001, 
they turned to De Haviland and found what appeared to be a compelling public policy 
rationale for the restoration of their rights. But because of the decision’s silence regarding 
employment’s class politics—its conversion of free individuals into superordinate and 
subordinate, behind the ‘no admittance’ sign—they found themselves at a loss to counter 
rhetorically the liberal assertions of privacy and voluntarism made by the RIAA, their record 
company employers, and the more right-wing legislators (Stahl, 2013). Their effort failed 
(Phillips, 2001, 2002; Phillips and Morain, 2001). 
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Subsequent petitioners on behalf of California’s entertainment industry talent workers are 
thus left with only a partial rhetorical weapon: working from the decision’s precedent, they 
may argue easily that it is established public policy in California that workers enjoy an 
inalienable right to total emancipation every seven years, but they have a harder time making 
broader arguments about why such protections are necessary in the first place, and why they 
must be inalienable to have any real effect. As I noted above, the general need for precisely 
this kind of duration-based emancipatory statute has waned since at-will employment 
eclipsed 19th century forms of bonded labour, but the need for inalienable protections has not. 
The disinclination of the appellate court to connect its concerns with social mobility to the 
lower court’s concerns with employers’ collective economic-coercive power deprives 
succeeding generations of Californians across economic sectors of what could have been a 
powerful precedent. I am suggesting that this disinclination contributes to and reifies the 
social-psychological chasm that seems to divide stars of film, music, and sports from workers 
in general, and that inhibits solidarity and common cause. 
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De Havilland’s case (as well as Newton-John, Oscar De la Hoya and others) supplies us with 
bigger-than-life parties, in marginal circumstances, whose highly visible and audible 
arguments throw the stakes of employment and contract into relief. As employment regimes 
throughout the Western world undergo tectonic changes, arguments like those that animated 
the De Havilland case invite us to ask about the politics of employment. Who should have 
protection from what? From whom? Why? In what circumstances? On what basis? To return 
to Berlin’s formulation, to what degree must ‘negative’ contract freedom (i.e. freedom from 
state intervention, secured, for example, by a strict liberal constitution) be moderated by 
‘positive’ social freedom (i.e. freedom to reject contracts voluntarily entered into, which is 
secured by ‘the police powers of the state’)? To what degree must freedom of contract be 
mitigated by freedom from contract? To what degree must the ‘liberty of the strong, whether 
their strength is physical or economic, …be restrained’ in order to support the liberty of the 
less strong? (Berlin, 1969, p. 169-170). 
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The De Havilland decision(s) resonates with the cultural studies and critical legal studies 
analyses offered by Danae Clark and Jane Gaines. Clark points out that the Hollywood actor’s 
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contract is ‘a paradoxical document. Although it created an imaginary relation of fair 
exchange between legal subjects,’ the contract ‘spelled out the terms by which one party 
would be able to transform the labor and representation of the second party’ (Clark, 1995, p. 
25). Gaines writes that the contract does more than produce ‘unequals as equals’ : ‘[t]he 
contract is magical not only in its facilitation of “imaginary relations” between parties but also 
in its capacity to transform and transfer the labor, rights, and property that society holds to 
be inalienable’ (Gaines, 1991, p. 154). Read through the frameworks offered by Clark and 
Gaines, these decisions suggest how contract puts employers and employees relations of 
superordinate and subordinate. 
Moving from cultural studies and critical legal studies approaches to a more explicitly political 
framework, the case demonstrates how contract transforms individuals’ rights to control their 
labour into negotiable bits of property, and why this transformation is of questionable 
legitimacy in democratic society. The De Havilland courts recognized (the lower explicitly, the 
higher implicitly) that employers’ market power in general and of necessity enables 
employers to dominate negotiations over the terms of employment such that individual 
employees’ rights regarding the disposition of their labour (and resulting intellectual 
property—see Stewart, 1984) are nearly always alienated in the bargain. The construction by 
law of the individuals’ capacities and rights to self-governance and property in the person as 
alienable—and the routine transfer to employers of those rights and capacities—are central to 
employment. But the legitimacy of the employment relation is thrown into question when the 
question of employment term limits comes up. You are allowed to contract to sell your labour 
by the day, week, month or year, but you may not, in California, sell the right to end your 
employment after seven years. The latter transaction, as Judge Burnell pointed out, could 
lead to ‘peonage’, ‘serfdom’, or even ‘life bondage’. The idea that the additional six months of 
work Warner Bros. Pictures sought to secure from Olivia De Havilland converts a perfectly 
legitimate relation into an illegitimate one points to the highly porous nature of the boundary 
between employment and slavery: how distinct could they really be if an extension of the 
contract by one fourteenth of its nominal duration can transform the former into the latter? 
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In Karl Polanyi’s terms, labour is a ‘fictitious commodity’. Unlike actual commodities, he 
wrote, ‘the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, 
or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the 
bearer of this peculiar commodity’ (Polanyi, 1965, p. 73). The factual inseparability of the 
person from her capacities is obscured by a fictitious commodification: the social construction 
famously christened ‘property in the person’ by John Locke. Inalienable capacities, treated as 
property, ‘can become the subject of [an employment] contract and marketed as “services”’ 
(Pateman, 2002, p. 27). The fictions of separability and commodification that are the basis of 
all such contracts are the achievement of the ‘paradoxical’ and ‘magical’ attributes to which 
Clark and Gaines draw attention. Pateman further explains that ‘ [t]he significant aspect of 
contracts that constitute such relations is not an exchange, but the alienation of a particular 
piece of property in the person, namely, the right of self-government’ (ibid.). This form of 
alienation—pronounced in Burnell’s Superior Court opinion, obscured in the Court of Appeal’s 
decision—remains central to employment in and out of the cultural industries today. 
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Parallel Cases    
Amplification of this principle may be found in two proximate cases: the aforementioned 
1985-87 changes in recording contract conventions and post-2001 changes in freelance 
journalist contract conventions. First, the outcome of MCA Records’ 1979 contract suit against 
Olivia Newton-John revealed to record companies and recording artists the existence (and 
efficacy) of the seven year rule, in part through the court’s invocation of De Haviland. Almost 
immediately, artists began seeking relief from contracts that had run in excess of seven years 
(McLane and Wong 1999), and the RIAA began lobbying the California Legislature to exclude 
recording artists from the seven year rule’s protection (Phillips and Graham, 1984; 
Krasilovsky and Shemel, 2003). Following the RIAA’s lead, the Legislature did this by 
converting (for recording artists only, through legislative legerdemain) the seven year rule’s 
inalienable right into a alienable right, a bit of negotiable property (Stahl, 2013). Since that 
time, record companies’ virtually monopsonic market power has ensured that this alienable 
right never survives contract negotiations un-alienated, even where the most successful and 
powerful performers are concerned. 
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Second, in New York Times v. Tasini (2001), the US Supreme Court ruled that newspapers’ 
republication on the internet of articles contractually permitted only to be published in print 
violated the freelance journalists’ contracts and copyrights. This decision was a mirror image 
of the Olivia Newton-John case, a pyrrhic victory in the opposite direction. Birnhack notes that 
Tasini’s main lesson…lies not in the judicial decision itself, but in the aftermath of the case. Following the decision, the 
newspapers changed their contractual relationship with the freelance journalists, so that the latter were required to transfer 
all possible rights to the newspapers, and in some cases, they were required to do so retroactively (2008, p. 24). 
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The perverse consequences of a decision in favour of the freelance journalists is accounted for 
by the market power of the newspapers. Taking advantage of an oversupply of freelance 
journalistic labour (with its concomitant competition between journalists for opportunities to 
publish), the newspapers could reconfigure the terms on which they offer access to the 
means of making a living such that all of the valuable but alienable rights that are vested 
initially in the journalists will be contractually (and hence “consensually”) alienated to the 
newspaper. ‘When “rights” are seen in proprietary terms’, as is usually the case in liberal 
society, ‘they can be alienated’, writes Carole Pateman (2002, p. 27). Market power places 
one person in a position profitably to separate another from her rights. 
37 
5. Star Employment, “Peonage,” and Routine 
Employment  
  
California’s statutory limit to contract duration was codified in 1872, during a period in which 
working people—particularly non-whites—were vulnerable to forms of unfreedom that could 
fairly be described as peonage (Mooney, 2000). Nevertheless, neither the statute itself nor 
the only case to hinge on it prior to 1943 (Stone v Bancroft [1903]) makes use of the term. 
De Haviland occasions the arrival of term ‘peonage’ in the public discourse around the seven 
year rule; the term figures in public statements made by De Havilland and her lawyer as well 
as in the Superior Court’s decision in favour of De Havilland. When film historians and star 
biographers discuss De Haviland and the seven year rule, they seem to use terms like 
‘peonage’ and ‘ anti-peonage’ in a way that highlights how exotic and extraordinary are the 
lives and trials of the Hollywood elite (Higham, 1984, p. 144; Schatz, 1988, p. 318; Balio, 
1993, p.160; see also Schwarz, 2007). This exoticising terminology accepts and supports the 
social-psychological distance between stars and other working people, obscuring their shared 
political-economic statuses, their shared dependence on (and vulnerability to) those in 
possession of the means of making a living. Taking public and student interest in Hollywood 
and its celebrities as something of a constant in 20th and early 21st century Anglo-American 
society, this article seeks to emphasise a sense of the conceptual usefulness of De Haviland 
decisions for closing this social-psychological and analytical distance and connecting the 
labour of stars to that of regular working people, at least in terms of the critical thought 
experiments that discussion of the decisions might support. The De Haviland decisions made 
no distinction between successful actors and other working people. This may be a sociological 
error, but it is also an imaginative boon. Cases such as De Havilland’s enable us conceptually 
to reintegrate star labour into the social division of labour and to draw on the spectacular 
dimensions of star employment in order to illuminate political lineaments of, and inject 
controversy into, the institution of employment, bridging apparently broad symbolic and 
social-psychological gulfs. 
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The 1944 De Haviland decisions offers an opportunity to think about the relations of 
employers, employees, and the state in the context of scholarly attempts to understand the 
relationship of creative to other forms of work in the tumultuously changing world of 
employment. ‘[T]he star system’, according to Tino Balio ‘became the prime means of 
stabilizing the motion picture business’ (Balio, 1993, p. 144). For this means of stabilization 
to work, the alienation of employee rights through contract had to be ironclad and long-term. 
To prevent this means of stabilization from slipping into a regime of patent ‘peonage’, 
freedom of contract had to be encroached upon. The De Haviland Appellate Court decision 
justified the seven year rule’s limitation on freedom of contract by asserting that the welfare 
of working people ‘is the direct concern of every community’. Such a justification is easily 
explained when demand for labour is so high that many workers need protection from 
overlong contracts, as was the case in California during much of the mid to late 19th century, 
and as remains the case in restricted labour markets like those of successful entertainers and 
athletes. But what about when demand is slack? Or when enterprise is so project-based and 
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mobile (or as is increasingly the case, concerned with financial activities over those that 
require employees—see Palley, 2013) that demand is unpredictable and uneven? 
The appellate court’s silence regarding the classed nature of the forces against which that 
welfare had to be protected makes it more difficult to translate the court’s rationale into 
contemporary terms. It’s one thing when the owners of the means to making a living grant 
access to those means on onerous terms; it’s another thing entirely when they withhold 
access. In the early 1970s, a member of the band Commander Cody and the Lost Planet 
Airmen joked that ‘[t]he only thing worse than selling out […] is selling out and not getting 
bought’ (Quoted in Stokes, 1977, p. 219). Today, labour markets are so flexible, and un- and 
underemployment so perilous, that new questions arising out of the De Havilland case 
concern those whom Castel (Castel, 2003, p. xiii) calls “supernumeraries,” people who are not 
fortunate enough to be dominated and exploited by capital. Castel observes that in the era of 
serfdom invoked by Judge Burnell, the labourer’s ‘[v]ulnerability was born from an excess of 
constraints’ (id., p. 6), that is, laws and police bound labourers to land owners and controlled 
their wages, contract durations, geographical mobility, criminalizing their failure to perform. 
Now, in what many are calling the neoliberal era (in large part because of the increasing 
hegemony of classical liberal thinking in the public as well as the private spheres), 
vulnerability ‘appears to be nourished by the enfeeblement of protections’ (id., p. 6), that is, 
by the accelerating rollback of 19th and 20th century labour protections, particularly those 
necessary to union activity. ‘Henceforth, for many individuals,’ writes Castel, ‘the future bears 
the imprimatur of jeopardy’ (id., p. xiii). 
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You might have a right to work in liberal society, and in California (as long as you are not a 
recording artist) you have an inalienable right to change employers every seven years, but 
you do not have a right to a job, and you do not have a right to a job you prefer, let alone a 
liveable income. It begins to appear axiomatic that employers are going to pursue and 
enforce terms for access to the means of making a living that they prefer. In a situation of 
worker oversupply relative to the number of available steady jobs enabling social mobility—
especially pronounced in the media industries—what rights ought people to have against 
those who control access to the means of making a living? The De Haviland courts argued in 
simple (but not simplistic) and appealing terms that the state should protect a baseline 
degree social mobility of working people through encroachment on the freedom of contract, 
thereby limiting the range of terms on which work is offered and accepted. One question that 
arises today is: what is the state’s role where social mobility is impeded by lack of a steady 
market for one’s labour? By lack of a contract? By lack of a job? 
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Many media scholars argue that media-makers represent the ‘model figure of the new worker’ 
of the burgeoning neoliberal economy, the sort of worker preferred by employers in the era of 
flexible accumulation (Menger, 2002, p. 8; see also Ross, 2000; Deuze, 2007; McRobbie, 
2011; Stahl, 2008). One of the crucial observations along these lines is that this employer 
desideratum is consonant—indeed, perhaps necessary to—the ongoing normalization of 
employment insecurity. Employers, in these analyses, would prefer working people of all 
kinds to think of themselves as artists, and for example, be prepared (as artists are) for long 
periods of un- and underemployment and irrational modes of evaluation and advancement 
(Menger, 2002, p. 10). Invocations of the artist as the new model worker enables us to 
explore the politics of the entire range of artistic working conditions (including the politics of 
anachronistic long-term or interminable contracts) in addition to the politics of work of the 
contemporary cultural industries (Banks, 2007; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2010). Examining 
limiting cases of star labour as exemplified in contract disputes like De Havilland’s can help 
clarify the historical and political legacy this new model bears. Such a focus exploits the 
capacity of creative workers’ struggles to act as what David Ellerman (1995, p. 64), calls an 
“intuition pump,” heightening awareness of deeper tensions in the received institution of 
employment. Such a focus helps clarify the relationship of media research at the margins of 
employment to the burning political-economic questions of work, the state and social mobility 
in perilous times. 
42 
6. Conclusion    
Employment is an institution that links those who depend on others for access to the means 
of making a living, both stars and ordinary people. A basic conceit of this article has been that 
struggles over the conditions of star employment, in which routine features of employment 
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are redefined as controversial around or by (often sympathetic) public figures, cast star 
employment as a limit case of work in general. Focusing on the sometimes spectacular terms 
and arguments in these struggles—remote as they may seem from the everyday lives of most 
working people—can put this limit case in service of a broader political conception of 
employment as a relation that is categorically susceptible to abuse by employers.8  
Olivia De Havilland’s 1944 contest with Warner Bros. Pictures, which Schatz (1988, p. 318) 
and Balio (1993, p. 160) agree was a ‘ watershed’ event in the history of the studio system, 
presents perspectives on employment that cut against contemporary liberalism and aid media 
scholarship toward consideration of the politics of work. On the one hand, these decisions 
offer insights into the labour history of the US film industry; indeed, De Havilland’s case 
“questioned the whole system of hiring stars on term contracts”; the case “would lead to 
stars wresting control of their careers from the studios” (McDonald, 2005, p. 62). On the 
other hand, examined in tandem, the two decisions are critical of dominant liberal 
conceptions of employment, making arguments that work is not only a matter of public 
concern, but that modern, liberal employment is an institution that is categorically susceptible 
to forms of abuse that put its liberal justifications into question. 
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Today, as the high-water marks of mid-century social legislation recede from view, an effort 
to broaden cultural conceptions of employment is especially important. Under the heading of 
neoliberalism, the arguments made by Warner Bros. Pictures in defence of their effort to hold 
actors to effectively interminable contracts—that arrangements between employer and 
employee are private—are becoming a new common sense, in public policy as well as the 
public imagination. During the last few decades, Bronfenbrenner and Warren write, ‘workers 
have witnessed the steady erosion of their economic security and workplace rights. In every 
aspect of basic labor and employment law, employer violations are increasing while agency 
enforcement is on the decline’ (2009, p. 127). Cases such as Olivia De Havilland’s bequeath 
episodes and frameworks through which to reconsider the relationship between positive 
liberty (freedom to use and develop one’s powers the way one chooses) and negative liberty 
(freedom from the external constraints of a sovereign or government). Assigning a value to 
the former means, in practice, limiting the capacity of the strong to invoke the latter. 
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This article comes out of my efforts to teach my research and that of others on cultural labour 
to undergraduates, and out of my conviction that the growing interest in cultural labour 
among media scholars offers an opportunity to hold employment up for critical scrutiny. By 
considering the contrasting political content of the two De Haviland decisions, it has sought to 
open up and exploit axes of inquiry that may seem remote from everyday discussion or the 
classroom, yet the struggles of stars have much to teach us. Moreover, in the contemporary 
context of ‘austerity’ and perilous rates of unemployment, especially youth unemployment, 
the rationales of the two decisions invoke their own shadow: where the rights and welfare of 
working people are matters of public concern, ought not those of the unemployed also be? 
Capitalism and liberalism have changed and are changing, but their basic legal frameworks—
including employment’s codification of employer and employee as superordinate and 
subordinate—persist. These nearly seventy-year-old decisions, from the margins of the 
modern employment relation, argue for a principle whose democratic logic is in danger of 
being forgotten: whoever you are, wherever you work, your social mobility requires 
formidable, even inalienable, protections against the social and market power of employers. 
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